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analyze the determinants of managers' expectations to have a soft loan. We show that managers' 
believes integrate some of the decision criteria of the banks: managers' expectations to have soft 
loans are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, higher for big firms and higher 
when firms had recently experienced financial distress. 
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The term\soft budget constraint"(SBC1) was ¯rst introduced by Kornai (1979)
to illuminate economic behavior in socialist economies. It is now widely used to
describe similar phenomena in post-socialist, developed and developing countries2.
The concept alludes to a situation in which a loss-making ¯rm is bailed out (by a
government, a bank or an other institution). Furthermore, the expectation of the
decision-maker as to whether the ¯rm will be bailed out in case of trouble is at the
heart of the syndrome because this expectation a®ects his behavior (Kornai, 1979;
1998a). The SBC syndrome is acknowledged to be an obstacle to the restructuring
of loss-making ¯rms, the e±cient use of inputs and macroeconomic stability (Dewa-
tripont and Roland, 2000). However, despite considerable progress in the last decade
to give theoretical explanations to the SBC syndrome3, empirical research on the
determinants of SBC is still in its infancy (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Kornai et al.,
2003). It is due to the fact that the notion of softness is di±cult to operationalize.
In line with the works of Kornai, an empirical measure has to capture the expec-
tations of managers to be bailed out in case of trouble. Thus, SBC theorists argue
that e.g. subsidization of loss-making ¯rms is not identical to SBC.4 Furthermore,
SBC theorists often argue that empirical works are not closely grounded in theory
(Kornai et al., 2003).
This empirical paper follows the line of research initiated by Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995) by considering that the SBC syndrome occurs when a funding source
(in our case banks) cannot commit to keep an enterprise to a ¯xed initial budget
and/or to maintain the timing of repayment speci¯ed by the contract. Indeed,
2despite the fact that the bank understands ex post that the ¯rm should not have
been ¯nanced initially, it might be optimal to re¯nance it because an initial injection
is sunk. If it is the case, we say that the ¯rm has a soft loan. We use a data set of
nearly 4500 loan applicants in 26 transition economies in which there is a selection
process from the banks among applicants. Firms which obtain a loan might expect
that if they fall behind in the repayment of their loan, the bank will extend the
term of the loan or will be ready to wait without beginning legal proceedings to
take possession of the collateral; this occurs because an initial injection of funds is
sunk. We analyze the determinants of the managers' expectations to have a soft
loan: we use a censored bivariate probit, because some projects were not ¯nanced
by the banks. The selection equation, i.e. to be granted a loan or not, is important
because it determines the capacity of the banks to apply accurate credit assessment.
Adequate lending criteria for the selection of projects allow the banks to decrease
the SBC syndrome.
Consequently, our paper contributes to the progress of the SBC literature in at
least two ways. First, our empirical work is linked to the line of research initiated
by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) which see the SBC as a commitment problem.
Furthermore, the framework allows to test other motives proposed by the literature,
like political motives of keeping workers employed. Second, our paper clearly follows
the idea that the SBC is related to decision-makers' expectations. Until now, only
Anderson et al. (2000) elicit directly managers' expectations. They focus on the
expectations of managers concerning state aid in case of ¯nancial di±culties by
investigating a data set of 200 Mongolian ¯rms. They examine various causes of soft
budgets in addition to state ownership but they do not consider the commitment
3problem as such.5
However, our paper has also two caveats. First, we focus on loan as a mean of
softening. Nevertheless, loans are not the unique mean of softening the BC. There are
various means of rescue (¯scal means like subsidies or tax concessions, credit means
like loans or trade credit), and when one mean of softening is restricted, like loans,
another may come to the fore, e.g. tax concessions. Consequently and following
this example, observing only loans or managers' expectations to have soft loans can
generate misleading conclusions if the major mean of softening is based on subsidies.
However, various authors (e.g., Berglof and Roland, 1998; Dewatripont and Roland,
2000) note that governments have drastically reduced subsidies to ¯rms in transition
economies and loss-making ¯rms are mostly bailed out via bank loans. Furthermore,
various empirical works have shown that the banking sector does not seem to apply
accurate credit assessment in transition economies. Banks tended to give preferences
to distressed ¯rms to allocate credit during the nineties6. Second, if our paper clearly
follows the idea that SBC is related to the ¯rm decision-makers' expectations, the
legitimacy to take expectations rather than facts into account might be questioned.
Thus, our study has the same disadvantage than Anderson et al. (2000). However,
given the paucity of empirical works on SBC, our analysis might o®er signi¯cant new
insights. Furthermore, we highlight that the SBC syndrome is related to managers'
expectations which, in turn, are formed upon the basis of their own experience and
that of other ¯rms in the economy (Kornai, 1979; Kornai et al., 2003).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our
framework. It permits to highlight the determinants of the SBC that we will test.
Section 3 presents our econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the data and
4results. Finally section 5 concludes.
2 To Have a Soft Loan or Not?
This section borrows from Kornai et al. (2003) and Boyes et al. (1989) and
presents the main aspects of our framework.
Assume that a ¯rm submits a project to a bank in period t. The bank can decide
to grant a loan of an amount l1 or to denied it. If funded, the project can yield a
gross monetary return of Rg > l1 within the period t. It can also be defaulted. In
such a case the bank has two possibilities:
² it could begin legal proceedings to take possession of the collateral of a value
Col.
² alternatively, the bank could re¯nance the project by injecting an additional
capital of l2, extend the term of the loan or do nothing and wait to obtain an
expected gross return of Rp in t+1. In such a case, the loan is said to be soft.
If the project is defaulted, the ¯rm manager will have a soft loan if:
Rp ¡ l2 > Col (1)
When condition 1 is satis¯ed, the loan is soft because the bank prefers to re¯nance
the project by injecting the additional capital, or to extend the term of the loan, or
to do nothing and wait. Thus, for a ¯rm which has obtained a loan in t, the lower
the collateral, the higher the probability of having a soft loan. Our data set allows
to test the following implication (see section 4 for a presentation of the data):
5Testable Implication 1 For a ¯rm which has obtained a loan, manager's expec-
tation to have a soft loan is lower when the initial ¯nancing requires collateral.
However, note that the ¯rm has a soft loan if and only if the bank has not been
able to select good applicants in the ¯rst step. The loan can be repaid or defaulted
(in such a situation the loan is soft or not). Then, each loan yields two possible





Rg ¡ l1 with probability p
maxfRp ¡ l2;Colg ¡ l1 with probability (1 ¡ p)
(2)
Following the literature on credit scoring (Boyes et al., 1989), the bank establishes
a credit approval for each ¯rm applicant if it knows all the parameters of this trial.
Hence, a loan is granted only to those ¯rms with probabilities of success p such that:
p >
l1 ¡ maxfRp ¡ l2;Colg
Rg ¡ maxfRp ¡ l2;Colg
´ ¹ p (3)
The ¯rm has a soft loan if p > ¹ p and Rp¡l2 > Col. One can see that the SBC is, in
statistical inference terminology, a type II error: the bank fails to reject the initial
funding of poor projects. Hence, the capacity of the bank to apply accurate credit
assessment in the ¯rst step is crucial because it can reduce the SBC problem.
The framework developed above can be extended to include di®erent possible
causes of the SBC syndrome identi¯ed by the theoretical literature. First, the bank's
ownership structure might matter. If a private bank is presumably in the business
of maximizing pro¯t, it is not the case of a state-owned bank. The latter maximizes
social welfare or political bene¯t of keeping ¯rm workers employed. Assume that
6the bank is state-owned and denote E the external e®ect of a project (E > 0). A
state-owned bank will re¯nance a project if Rp + E ¡ l2 > Col. This condition is
less demanding than Rp ¡l2 > Col; thus we obtain the second testable implication:
Testable Implication 2 A manager who has obtained a loan from a state-owned
bank has a higher expectation to have a soft loan than a manager who has obtained
a loan from a private bank.
However, the following remark is necessary. The game sketched above is com-
posed of two players: a ¯rm manager and a bank. Now, let's assume that there is
a third player, the government, and that the bank is private. In such a case, if the
¯rm is a political capital for the government (the ¯rm is state-owned, too big to fail,
or a monopoly7), even a private bank might extend the term of the loan to the ¯rm
or wait and do nothing because the private bank expects the government will be the
ultimate guarantor of the ¯rm in case of trouble.
Testable Implication 3 A ¯rm which is a political capital for the government has
a higher probability to have a soft loan, even if granted by a private bank, than a
¯rm which is not a political capital and vice versa. Furthermore, a ¯rm which is a
political capital is more able to obtain a loan than a ¯rm which is not because the
bank might expect that the ¯rm which is a political capital has a ultimate guarantor,
i.e. the government, in case of trouble.
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3.1 A bivariate qualitative dependent variable model with
censoring
Given the model sketched above and the data at our disposal (that we will de-
scribe in the next section), expectations to have a soft loan are censored since banks
do not grant a loan to all the applicants because of a selection process. Conse-
quently the bivariate probit with censoring is the natural tool for our estimations.
This econometric model was ¯rst explored by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981).8
Suppose that Y ¤
i is a continuous latent variable re°ecting the degree of softness
of the budget constraint of enterprise i. Thus, we have:
Y
¤
i = X1i¯ + ²1i (4)
with X1i a vector of observed observations, including the variables considered as po-
tential determinants of managers' expectations: the collateral, the degree of market
power, the size and the ownership of the ¯rm. We will call this equation the Soft
equation. We consider the binary response of enterprise i about the expectation to
have a soft loan or not:
Softi = 1 if Y
¤
i > 0 (5)
Softi = 0 if Y
¤
i · 0 (6)
The dependent variable, however, is censored since only ¯rm applicants that
8received a credit are observed. To put this in a familiar context, the selection
equation is:
Loani = (Zi° + ²2i > 0) (7)
with Loani = 1 if the ¯rm i obtains a loan, 0 otherwise. Zi includes traditional
variables of credit scoring models: the ¯rm's and manager's characteristics. Finally,
note that V ar(²1i) = V ar(²2i) = 1 (this assumption is the standard normalization
for probit selection equation) and Cov(²1i;²2i) = ½. The selection equation, called
the Loan equation, is fundamental since the capacity of the banking system to apply
accurate lending criteria is crucial. If Loan = 1 and Soft = 1, the manager obtains
a soft loan. Thus the probability that a manager obtains a soft loan is the bivariate
probability Prob(Soft = 1;Loan = 1).













where S is the set of observations for which Softi is observed. © and ©2 are the stan-
dard cumulative normal and the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function,
respectively.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Data and Model Speci¯cation
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Business Enivronmment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), developed jointly by the World Bank (WB)
9and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It is a sur-
vey of 6367 ¯rms in 26 transition economies9, as well as in Turkey, conducted in
the ¯rst half of 2002. It was collected on the basis of face-to-face interviews with
owners, managers or ¯nance o±cers through site visits by surveyors trained accord-
ing to a standardized methodology. The sample was structured to be representative
of each countries with speci¯c quotas placed on size, sector, ownership and export
orientation (MEMRB, 2002; Hellman and Kaufman, 2002). We have restricted our
sample to ¯rms in transition economies, i.e. we drop ¯rms located in Turkey (511
observations).
-Insert table 1-
The BEEPS data set includes some particulary interesting questions dealing with
SBC. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest. It
especially provides the two following crucial informations:
² If the ¯rm has obtained a loan recently or not (the Loan variable).
² And if the ¯rm has obtained a loan, does the ¯rm expect to have a soft loan
(the Soft variable).
Concerning the Loan variable, we do not know directly from the data set if the
¯rms which do not have a loan ask for it or not. Like in traditional credit scoring
models (Boyes et al., 1989; Greene, 1992), we consider only ¯rms which are loan
applicants. However, we know from the survey if the ¯rm faces major obstacles
to get a ¯nancing from banks. Consequently, we drop of the survey all the ¯rms
without loans which consider not to have major di±culties to be granted a loan
10(1225 ¯rms, Turkish ¯rms excluded). Thus, we consider that the applicants are the
¯rms which are granted a loan (2368) and those ¯rms which do not have a loan
and whom access to ¯nancing from banks is an obstacle (2253). Consequently, we
have 4621 loan applicants10. The lost of observations caused by missing answers is
around 23% of the original sample. But we believe that this does not bias our results
because the summary statistics of the original and the used sample look very similar
(table 1).
The Soft variable re°ects the expectations of managers concerning the bank's
reaction if they fall behind in their bank repayments. More precisely, the question
is the following:
Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If your ¯rm were
to fall behind in its bank repayments, which of the following would best
describe how you would expect the bank to react? [1] Do nothing, [2]
Extend the term of the loan without changing the condition, [3] Extend the
term of the loan but increase the interest rate, [4] Begin legal proceedings
to take possession of assets, [5] Don't know.
-Insert table 2-
Concerning the answers, none of the managers answer that [5] they do not know.
We assume that Softi = 1 if the manager of the ¯rm i expects that [1] the bank
will do nothing or [2] the bank extend the term of the loan without changing the
condition. Indeed, in these two cases, the loan is soft. Softi = 0 if the manager of
the ¯rm i expects that [3] the bank will extend the term of the loan but increase
the interest rate, or [4] the bank will begin legal proceedings to take possession
11possession of assets. Considering that Softi = 0 when the manager of the ¯rm i
expects [3] is defensible, but admittedly arbitrary. Furthermore, answer [3] is the
answer the most often quoted (see table 2). Consequently, we have also considered
that Softi = 1 if the manager answers [3] but the results are qualitatively the same.
Following the framework of section 2, there are at least ¯ve sets of regressors
of the Soft equation in which we are mainly interested. The variables of special
interest are the following:
² We consider the variable Col to test implication 1, with Col = 1 if the initial
¯nancing required collateral, 0 otherwise.
² For implication 2, we consider a set of dummy variables that re°ects the own-
ership type of the main ¯nancial source of the ¯rms. However, we note that
the BEEPS data set does not specify if the loan in consideration came from the
main ¯nancial source of the ¯rm. Consequently, the results obtained will be
only indicative. It might not re°ect perfectly if the ownership of the funding
source in°uences a manager's expectation to have a soft loan.
² For implication 3, we ¯rst consider a set of dummy variables that depicts the
type of the ¯rm's main shareholder. We especially expect that the manager of
state ¯rm has a higher probability to contractual arrangements such as term's
extension. Furthermore, state ¯rms might be a political capital and the banks
will rather grant a loan to them because they expect the government plays as
a ultimate guarantor.
² Second, we also consider a set of dummy variables that describe the ¯rm's size.
We expect that the expectations to have a soft loan are higher (lower) for large
12(small) ¯rms. Furthermore, the bigger (smaller) the ¯rm, the higher (lower)
the probability that it is a political capital for the government, and thus the
higher is the probability to obtain a loan in a ¯rst step.
² Third, a set of dummy variables standing for the ¯rm's market power is intro-
duced.
We will also introduce various control variables that might explain managers'
expectations. First, we consider a dummy variable indicating if the ¯rm had ¯nancial
di±culties in the recent past or not. If the ¯rm had been unpro¯table, it means
that it has been helped out, and the survival of the ¯rm breaks away from its
¯nancial situation. Thus, \the manager of the ¯rm may feel that the probability
has grown that his ¯rm would also survive despite a ¯nancial failure caused by a
wrong investment" (Kornai, 1979, p.807). We will also control for the ¯rm's and
manager's characteristics: age and education of the manager, sector of activity and
the percentage of sales by customers (the government, multinationals or others).
The right-hand side variables of the loan equation are, like in a traditional scoring
model, variables re°ecting the characteristics of the ¯rm and its manager. Thus they
are mainly the same than those of the Soft equation. However, identi¯cation of the
parameters of the Soft equation necessitates exclusion restrictions. These variables
would ideally in°uence the Loan equation, but not the Soft equation. We propose
the following exclusion variables:
² A dummy variable (IAS) equal to 1 if the ¯rm uses international accounting
standards, 0 otherwise.
² A dummy variable (Extaudit) equal to 1 if the ¯rm lets its annual ¯nancial
13statement reviewed by an external auditor, 0 otherwise.
² A dummy variable (Training) equal to 1 if some employees received training
in 2001 (managers or workers).
These exclusion variables can in°uence the bank's decision to grant a loan to the
¯rm. Indeed, using international accounting standards, having an external auditor
reviewing annual ¯nancial statement or o®ering formal training to employees can be
perceived by the bank as a signal of a ¯rm trying to adapt to the rules of a market
economy. Consequently, a bank is more disposed to grant a loan to such a ¯rm.
However, there is no logical or theoretical explanations which can directly link these
variables to the fact to have a soft loan or not (and none of them is statistically
signi¯cant when we include them in a probit estimation of the Soft equation).
Finally we will use a set of dummy variables called Macro to control for dif-
ferences in the quality of the banking system of the 26 countries. The quality of
the banking system is re°ected by the variable \Banking reform" of the EBRD in
2001. This variable comes from 1 to 4.33. However, this variable is ordinal but not
cardinal. A score of 4 for a country does not mean that it has made twice as much
progress in banking reform than a country scoring 2. To overcome this problem, we
transform the \banking reform" (BR) indicator into three dummy variables. The
variable Macro1 takes the value 1 if the BR indicator is greater than 3, 0 otherwise.
The variables Macro2 = 1 if BR 2]2;3], 0 otherwise and Macro3 = 1 if BR 2 [1;2],
0 otherwise.
144.2 Results
The bivariate censored probit estimates for the loan granting decision (Loan)
and the expectation to have a soft loan (Soft) are presented in table 3. In all the
speci¯cations, we control for autocorrelation by clustering the bivariate censored
probit at the country-level. Contrary to speci¯cation [B], speci¯cation [A] does
not control for di®erences in the ¯nancial environment of 26 countries through the
Macro dummy variables. In table 4, we present the marginal e®ects (or discrete
changes for dummy variables) at the mean values of some important variables for
the probability of obtaining a loan, i.e. it presents
@Prob[Loan=1jX]
@X , with X = X1[Z.
The marginal e®ects of column [A] in table 4 correspond to the results of the selection
equation Loan of speci¯cation [A] in table 3 and so on. In table 5, we present the
marginal e®ects of some explanatory variables on manager's expectations at the
means values, conditional to the obtention of a loan, i.e.
@Prob[SoftjLoan=1;X]
@X . Finally,




-Insert tables 3, 4, 5 and 6-
The collateral-testable implication 1-
In line with the framework presented in section 2, ¯rms' managers whom initial
¯nancing required collateral are less likely to expect to have a soft loan. A ¯rm
whom initial ¯nancing required collateral is 9:7¡11:2% less likely to expect to have
a soft loan when it has obtained previously a loan (table 5).
Ownership of the bank-testable implication 2-
15Surprisingly, we do not ¯nd any statistical positive relation between the fact that
a bank is state-owned and expectations to have a soft loan. Furthermore there is
no di®erence whatever the ownership of the funding sources. This result is perhaps
due to the fact that we do not really know if the main ¯nancing source is the bank
which grants the loan.
The size of the ¯rm-testable implication 3-
The larger the ¯rm, the more likely to obtain a loan. Table 4 indicates that ¯rms
with more than 250 employees are 8:65-9:63% more likely to obtain a loan than ¯rms
which have between 50 and 250 employees ceteris paribus. Firms with less than 50
employees are 16:83 ¡ 18:15% less likely to obtain a loan than ¯rms which employ
between 50 and 250 employees. Now, what is the in°uence of the ¯rm's size on
managers expectations to have an extension, conditional to the fact that they have
obtained a loan? When they have obtained a loan, the expectations of ¯rms with less
than 50 employees are 6:6 ¡ 7:57% less important than bigger ¯rms (table 5). And,
¯rms with less than 50 employees are 9:93 ¡ 10:91% less likely to obtain a soft loan
than the others (table 6). These results suggest that large ¯rms constitute probably
a political capital for the government. Consequently, the banks prefer to select big
¯rms' loan applicants as they know that the government is a ultimate guarantor in
case of ¯nancial trouble.
Ownership of the ¯rm-testable implication 3-
The results concerning the ¯rm ownership contrast with those obtained for the
size. First, state-owned enterprises are 6:8 ¡ 8:6% less likely to obtain a loan than
foreign ¯rms (table 4). Furthermore, a state manager who obtains a loan is not more
likely to expect the bank will help in case of trouble (table 5). It seems that state-
16owned ownership per se does not constitute a reason for the government to rescue
¯rms. On the contrary, when ¯rms are owned by employees, ¯rms are 8:1% more
likely to obtain a loan when we control for the ¯nancial macroeconomic environment
(speci¯cation [B], table 4). Furthermore, a ¯rm owned by employees is 12:3% more
likely to expect to have a soft loan when it has a loan (table 5).
These results, apparently paradoxical, might be explained by various elements.
On the one hand, many authors highlight that governments have drastically reduced
subsidies to SOE, especially in Hungary and Poland (Aghion & Blanchard, 1994;
Pinto et al., 1993). On the other hand, various authors highlight that policymakers
gave away ¯rms' ownership and control to employees to lean on them for supporting
reforms, especially in CIS countries (Stern in Hirschler, 2000; Kornai, 2001). Thus,
these governments couldn't do anything but help them in case of trouble through
an extension of the terms of repayment (if the government controls the bank), or
subsidies. Otherwise, the political capital that the governments obtained would have
been lost.
In line with these remarks, it seems that the results concerning employee own-
ership obtained when we use all the sample are driven by CIS data. In fact, we
estimated speci¯cation [B] by dropping the observations of CIS and non-CIS at a
time11. When we considered only ¯rms in CIS, ¯rms owned by employees are 10:8%
more likely to obtain a loan (at the 5% level) than foreign companies. Furthermore,
they are 20:2% more likely to expect to have a soft loan when having a loan. On the
contrary, in the non-CIS countries, ¯rms owned by employees are not more likely to
obtain a loan and do not have di®erent expectations than the base group12.
Market power-testable implication 3-
17Firms which enjoy market power, i.e. having less than 4 competitors, are 6%-7%
less likely to obtain a loan (table 4). Furthermore, the competition environment
does not seem to in°uence managers'expectations (table 5).
Past ¯rm's performance
Firms which were unpro¯table in 2001 are not more likely to obtain a loan. Thus,
results might suggest that there is an amelioration of the banking system because
various authors have shown that banks tended to give preferences to distressed ¯rms
to allocate credit during the nineties in transition countries (Bonin and Scha®er,
1995; Brana et al., 1999; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001). However, managers of ¯rms
which were in ¯nancial distress in 2001 and who obtain a loan are more likely to
believe that the bank will not engage legal proceedings if they fall behind in their
repayment. Considering the ¯rms that obtained a loan, those which were unprof-
itable in 2001 are 12¡13:15% more likely to believe that they have a soft loan than
those which were pro¯table in 2001 (table 4).
Lastly, the estimate of ½ that maximizes the bivariate probit likelihood presented
in equation 8 is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from 0 in both speci¯cations (see
table 3) at the 15% level. It suggests that unexplained tendencies to grant a credit
are associated with a lower frequencies of managers' expectations to have a soft loan.
To check the robustness of these results, we repeated the estimations for various
sub-samples and control variables (not reported). We ¯rst repeated the regressions
for various sub-samples. We estimated the same speci¯cations by dropping all the
observations of one country at a time. Second, we divided the data set into the
CIS and the non-CIS countries. Results were qualitatively the same, except for the
\employee ownership variable" as mentioned previously. Third, we also introduced
18country dummy variables instead of the Macro dummies. Results were identical.
Lastly, the Soft variable re°ects the expectations of managers concerning the bank's
reaction in case of trouble. We highlighted in subsection 4.1 that we considered
Soft = 0 when managers expect [4] that the bank will begin legal proceedings to
take possession of assets and also when [3] the bank will extend the term of the loan
but increase the interest rate. Considering that Soft = 0 when managers answer
[3] is arbitrary; thus we also considered that Soft = 1 when managers answer [3].
Results were broadly the same. The main di®erence concerns the collateral variable.
If we consider Soft = 1 when managers answer [1], [2] or [3], we conclude at the 5%
level of signi¯cance that ¯rms whom initial ¯nancing required collateral are 4:97%
less likely to expect to have a soft loan when it get a loan (contrary to 9:7 ¡ 11:2%
obtained previously).13
5 Conclusion
This empirical paper considers that the SBC syndrome occurs when a funding
source (in our case banks) cannot commit to hold an enterprise to a ¯xed initial
budget and/or the timing of repayment. Four results seem to be robust. First,
managers' expectations to have a soft loan are lower when the initial ¯nancing re-
quires collateral. Second, the probability to obtain a loan as well as the probability
to expect a soft loan are higher for large ¯rms. The third conclusion is not trivial:
managers of state ¯rm don't exhibit di®erent expectations than managers of other
¯rms and have a lower probability to obtain a loan. Finally, managers of ¯rms which
were in ¯nancial distress in the past history are more likely to believe that the bank
19will not engage in legal proceedings.
We conclude with two words of caution. First, concerning the no signi¯cance of
the ownership of banks, our results are no more than suggestive because we do not
really know if the main ¯nancing source is the bank which grants the loan. Second,
we assumed in the paper that Soft really measures soft budgets, i.e. expectations
are perfect. But it might re°ect manager's erroneous expectations. Nevertheless, the
dependent variable examined in our paper re°ects an important element of reality
as highlighted by Anderson et al (2000). Even if expectations are erroneous, it is
expectations that lead to ine±cient enterprise decisions. These two remarks highlight
that we need more surveys speci¯cally designed for studying the determinants of the
SBC phenomenon. It might open a wide ¯eld for further research.
20Notes
1HBC and BC stand respectively for hard budget constraint and budget constraint.
2For example Huang and Xu (1998) believe that the SBC in the banking sector of East Asia
have played an important role in the ¯nancial crisis of the late nineties.
3See Kornai et al. (2003) for a review of theoretical explanations of the SBC syndrome.
4For example, Qian and Roland (1998) remarks that \Subsidization of loss-making ¯rms is
often an indicator of soft budget constraints. However, subsidies are not identical to soft budget
constraints. There are cases in which ¯rms receive subsidies but do not expect to be bailed in cases
of bad ¯nancial performance."
5Two other important empirical papers provide indirect con¯rmation that SBC is incorporated
in managers' expectations. Using a sample of several hundred Chinese state ¯rms over the period
1980-1994, Li and Liang (1998) show that losses were especially due to labor redundancy. It
con¯rms indirectly that managers were convinced to be perpetually rescued. In a panel data set
of Italian state-owned ¯rms interviewed from 1977 to 1993, Bertero and Rondi (2000) indirectly
show that managers' expectations evolved at the end of the 1980s: state ¯rms responded to the
decrease of subsidies and bank loans (probably due to the European Union pressure in order to
reduce state aid and to accelerate privatization programs) by increasing productivity and reducing
overmanning.
6See, to name but a few examples, Bonin and Scha®er (1995) and Scha®er (1998) for Hungary,
Brana et al. (1999) for Russia, Coricelli and Djankov (2001) for Romania.
7As argued by Kornai (1998a), a ¯rm which enjoys market power might be a political capital
because the liquidation of its assets may upset other ¯rms as well, and precipitate a serious loss
for the society.
8See also Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene (1992) who applied the same econometric model to
credit scoring.
9Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia.
2110The initial data set is composed from 6367 ¯rms. We dropped ¯rst 511 Turkish ¯rms. We also
dropped 1225 ¯rms which were not loan applicants. Finally, 10 o±cials do not answer if they have
obtained a loan recently or not.
11Results are not reported but available upon request.
12Di®erences also occur for family ¯rms: it is apparently easier for a family ¯rm in non-CIS
countries to obtain a loan than in CIS countries. In both cases, expectations to have a soft loan is
identical to the base group.
13Remember that [1] means that the manager expects that the bank will do nothing if the ¯rm
falls behind in its bank repayment and [2] the bank will extend the term of the loan. We also
conclude that managers of ¯rms which were in ¯nancial distress in 2001 and who obtain a loan
are not more likely to believe that the bank will not engage legal proceedings. In fact, this change
in the results occurs because, when we also consider that Soft = 1 when managers answer [3],
the percentage of ¯rms for which Soft = 1 that are in ¯nancial trouble is largely reduced. If we
consider that Soft = 1 when managers answer [1] and [2], 8.8% of these ¯rms were in trouble in
2001. If we consider that Soft = 1 when managers answer [1], [2] and [3], 6.6% of these ¯rms were
in trouble in 2001 (89/1340). This di®erence of 2.2 points is due to the fact that only 4.5% of the
663 ¯rms answering [3] were in ¯nancial di±culties in 2001.
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26Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables of the sample
Original sample Used sample Both samples
Firm's characteristics Obs Mean Std. dev. Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
The ¯rm recently got a loan 4621 0.512 0.499 3531 0.489 0.499 0 1
Unpro¯table in 2001 4388 0.061 0.239 3531 0.060 0.238 0 1
Largest shareholder
Individual 4631 0.514 0.499 3531 0.510 0.499 0 1
Family 4631 0.065 0.248 3531 0.067 0.250 0 1
Domestic company 4631 0.073 0.259 3531 0.073 0.260 0 1
Foreign company 4631 0.095 0.294 3531 0.096 0.295 0 1
Manager of the ¯rm 4631 0.030 0.172 3531 0.029 0.169 0 1
Employees of the ¯rm 4631 0.036 0.186 3531 0.037 0.189 0 1
Government 4631 0.123 0.329 3531 0.128 0.334 0 1
Others 4631 0.060 0.238 3531 0.058 0.232 0 1
Firm's size
Less than 49 employees 4631 0.669 0.470 3531 0.664 0.472 0 1
Between 50 - 249 employees 4631 0.186 0.389 3531 0.186 0.389 0 1
More than 250 employees 4631 0.144 0.351 3531 0.149 0.356 0 1
Market power
Monopoly 4542 0.013 0.113 3531 0.013 0.113 0 1
1-3 competitors 4542 0.163 0.369 3531 0.166 0.372 0 1
4 or more competitors 4542 0.823 0.380 3531 0.820 0.383 0 1
Customers
Sales to government 4631 10.269 23.68 3531 10.820 24.37 0 100
Sales to multinationals 4631 4.024 13.77 3531 4.18 14.14 0 100
Manager's characteristics 1
Expect to be bailed out by the bank 2025 0.412 0.492 1676 0.405 0.490 0 1
Loan's characteristics
collateral 2368 0.806 .385 1676 0.815 0.378 0 1
Financing Source
Local private bank 4631 0.100 0.300 3531 0.096 0.293 0 1
State bank 4631 0.056 .230 3531 0.052 0.221 0 1
Foreign bank 4631 0.024 .154 3531 0.024 0.153 0 1
>From family and friends 4631 0.073 .260 3531 0.070 0.255 0 1
Government 4631 0.017 .130 3531 0.015 0.121 0 1
Exclusion variables
External auditor 4513 0.491 0.499 3531 0.491 0.499 0 1
International accounting standards 4237 0.397 0.489 3531 0.385 0.486 0 1
Training 4584 0.525 0.499 3531 0.525 0.499 0 1
27Table 2: Enterprise o±cials were asked the following question: If your ¯rm were to fall
behind in its bank repayments, which of the following would best describe how
you would expect the bank to react? - Total sample
Total sample Used sample
Number Percent Number Percent
[1] Do nothing 106 5.23 84 5.01
[2] Extend the term of the loan without changing the condition 729 36.00 593 35.42
[3] Extend the term of the loan but increase the interest rate 800 39.51 663 39.54
[4] Begin legal proceedings to take possession possession of assets 390 19.26 336 20.03
Total 2,025 100.00 1676 100
Note: only ¯rms which obtained a loan have answered to this question.
28Table 3: Bivariate censored probit estimates
[A] [B]
Soft Loan Soft Loan
Main Shareholder
Individual 0.041 -0.018 0.040 0.021
Family -0.15 0.25** -0.16 0.23**
Domestic company -0.14 0.32*** -0.16 0.35***
Foreign company Base group Base group
Managers -0.016 -0.05 -0.011 0.04
Employees 0.21 0.078 0.21 0.20
Government 0.12 -0.22*** 0.11 -0.17**
Others 0.11 0.064 0.09 0.04
Firm's size
Employees<50 -0.02 -0.42*** -0.014 -0.46***
50·Employees<250 Base group Base group
Employees¸250 -0.12 0.24*** -0.13 0.21***
Market power
Monopoly -0.12 -0.15 -0.12 -0.17**
1-3 competitors Base group Base group
4 or more competitors 0.009 -0.049 0.007 -0.05
Customers
Sales to government -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0006




Local private bank 0.11 0.11
State bank 0.03 -0.01
Foreign bank 0.009 0.016
>From family-friends -0.21 -0.18
Government -0.38 -0.39
Unpro¯table in 2001 0.30** -0.001 0.31* -0.08
External audit 0.17** 0.14**
Training 0.36*** 0.30***
IAS 0.08 0.12*
Manager education dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes




N censored 1855 1855
Log likelihood -3278.33 -3217.76
Notes: y , ¤, ¤¤ and ¤ ¤ ¤ represent 10, 5 and 1% signi¯cance, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered by country in the three speci¯cations.
29Table 4: Some marginal e®ects of change in X for the probability









Individual -0.007 0.023 0.008 0.024
Family 0.099** 0.045 0.094** 0.041
Domestic company 0.130*** 0.032 0.139*** 0.033
Foreign company Base group Base group
Managers -0.02 0.081 0.015 0.082
Employees 0.031 0.051 0.081* 0.042
Government -0.086*** 0.028 -0.068** 0.029
Others 0.025 0.056 0.018 0.046
Firm's size
Employees<50 -0.168*** 0.020 -0.18*** 0.016
50 ·Employees< 250 Base group Base group
Employees¸250 0.096*** 0.022 0.086*** 0.020
Market power
Monopoly -0.06* 0.032 -0.07** 0.032
1-3 competitors Base group Base group
4 or more competitors -0.009 0.023 -0.020 0.022
Unpro¯table in 2001 -0.004 0.054 -0.003 0.04
Notes: y, *, ** and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% signi¯cance, respectively. The estimators are marginal
e®ects at the means values. The estimators presented in column [A] are associated with the selection
equation (Loan) of the bivariate probit with censoring presented in column [A] of table 3. Column [B]
is likewise.
30Table 5: Some marginal e®ects of change in X for the probability of expecting to have









Individual 0.015 0.031 0.020 0.032
Family -0.032 0.060 -0.034 0.061
Domestic company -0.017 0.045 -0.016 0.046
Foreign company Base group Base group
Managers -0.014 0.076 0.001 0.080
Employees 0.103 0.072 0.123* 0.067
Government 0.019 0.066 0.022 0.066
Others 0.055 0.049 0.047 0.054
Firm's size
Employees<50 -0.066** 0.0329 -0.075** 0.031
50 ·Employees< 250 Base group Base group
Employees¸250 -0.021 0.0323 -0.021 0.033
Market power
Monopoly -0.071 0.108 -0.079 0.104
1-3 competitors Base group Base group
4 or more competitors 0.0005 0.03 -0.004 0.032
Loan's characteristics
Collateral -0.112*** 0.032 -0.097*** 0.032
Unpro¯table in 2001 0.131** 0.052 0.122* 0.064
Notes: y, *, ** and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% signi¯cance, respectively. The estimators are marginal e®ects at
the means values. The estimators presented in column [A] are associated with the bivariate probit with censoring
presented in column [A] of table 3. Column [B] is likewise.










Individual 0.004 0.0176 0.013 0.018
Family 0.02 0.035 0.016 0.036
Domestic company 0.039 0.027 0.043 0.030
Foreign company Base group Base group
Managers -0.014 0.05 0.006 0.052
Employees 0.064 0.046 0.098*** 0.037
Government -0.025 0.025 -0.016 0.024
Others 0.037 0.03 0.03 0.029
Firm's size
Employees<50 -0.10*** 0.014 -0.109*** 0.013
<=Employees<250 Base group Base group
Employees>=250 0.025 0.02 0.021 0.020
Market power
Monopoly -0.053 0.042 -0.058y 0.04
1-3 competitors Base group Base group
4 or more competitors -0.003 0.015 -0.009 0.017
Loan's characteristics
Collateral -0.053*** 0.018 -0.047*** 0.017
Unpro¯table in 2001 0.062** 0.028 0.041y 0.028
Notes: y, *, ** and *** represent 15, 10, 5 and 1% signi¯cance, respectively. The estimators are marginal
e®ects at the mean values. The estimators presented in column [A] are associated with the bivariate probit with
censoring presented in column [A] of table 3. Column [B] is likewise.
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